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ARTICLE
Emotion in imaginative resistance
Dylan Campbell, William Kidder†, Jason D’Cruz, Brendan Gaesser and 
Department of Psychology, University at Albany, State University of New York, Albany, NY, USA
ABSTRACT
Imaginative resistance refers to cases in which one’s other-
wise flexible imaginative capacity is constrained by an unwill-
ingness or inability to imaginatively engage with a given 
claim. In three studies, we explored which specific imagina-
tive demands engender resistance when imagining morally 
deviant worlds and whether individual differences in emo-
tion predict the degree of this resistance. In Study 1 (N = 176), 
participants resisted the notion that harmful actions could be 
morally acceptable in the world of a narrative regardless of 
the author’s claims about these actions but did not resist 
imagining that a perpetrator of harm could believe their 
actions to be morally acceptable. In Study 2 (N = 167) we 
replicated the findings of Study 1 and showed that imagina-
tive resistance is greatest among participants who experi-
ence more negative affect in response to imagining harm 
and are lower in either trait anxiety or trait psychopathy. In 
Study 3 (N = 210) we show that this is the case even when the 
harms assessed include both low-severity (i.e., emotional 
harm) and high-severity (i.e., killing) cases. Thus, people’s 
moral beliefs constrain their ability to imagine hypothetical 
moral alternatives, although this ability systematically varies 
on the basis of stable individual differences in emotion.
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Suppose you are presented with a description of a case in which a person 
was horrendously murdered in cold blood. You are told that the murderer 
had brown hair, that the murder took place in a diner, and that the murderer 
saw a child eating cereal, then walked to them and stabbed them in the chest. 
You are able to imagine and consider these hypothetical physical details as 
horrific, but possible. However, suppose that this description closed with 
a statement that the murder of the child was not immoral, but in fact was 
a morally commendable action. Here, one’s narrative imagination loses 
a certain flexibility: while we seem capable of imaginatively engaging with 
and considering descriptions of events we take to be immoral, we resist 
imagining that such events could be morally acceptable.
CONTACT Dylan Campbell dcampbell3@albany.edu Department of Psychology, University at Albany, 
State University of New York, 1400 Washington Ave, Albany, NY 12222, USA
†Co-first authors.
PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY                         
https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2021.1932786
© 2021 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This phenomenon was first discussed by David Hume (1757/1987) in the 
context of what he recognized as a curious asymmetry in how people engage 
with narrative works of fiction. While people are quite willing to entertain 
and imagine all manner of absurdity when reading the works of Homer, 
Ovid, Aristo, and Cervantes, they are unwilling (or unable) to engage 
imaginatively with morally counterfactual worlds, that is, worlds whose 
moral norms differ vastly from our own. Two centuries later, Hume’s puzzle 
has once again gripped philosophers. In a seminal 2000 paper Tamar Szabó 
Gendler dubbed this phenomenon, “The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance,” 
which she takes to be “the puzzle of explaining our comparative difficulty in 
imagining fictional worlds that we take to be morally deviant” (p. 56). In this 
context, imagination thus refers to accepting a statement as true within 
a fictional world as opposed to imagining specific scenes play out within that 
world. Recent empirical work has established that imaginative resistance is 
in fact a real psychological phenomenon (Barnes & Black, 2016; Black & 
Barnes, 2017; Liao et al., 2014) yet has not adequately addressed questions 
about how and why this phenomenon occurs – questions of considerable 
importance both to philosophers’ conception of imaginative resistance and 
our understanding of moral judgment and moral possibilities more broadly. 
In the current set of studies, we sought to address gaps in this literature by 
investigating how imaginative resistance occurs, empirically distinguishing 
among different forms of this phenomenon described in the philosophical 
literature, and why imaginative resistance occurs, showing that stable indi-
vidual differences related to the experience of emotion predict the degree to 
which one resists engaging with morally counterfactual worlds.
Empirical research on imaginative resistance has uncovered several 
important aspects of this phenomenon. For example, Liao et al. (2014) 
showed that the genre in which a narrative is situated predicts the degree 
of resistance people experience; people experienced greater difficulty in 
imagining that the sacrifice of a child could be morally correct when this 
action was situated in the context of a police procedural as opposed to an 
Aztec myth, suggesting that imaginative resistance relies to some degree on 
the set of expectations people bring to their reading of different genres. 
Barnes and Black (2016) compared people’s ability to imagine morally 
deviant worlds with two other types of fictional worlds: factually unlikely 
ones (e.g., a world in which woolly mammoths terrorize Las Vegas) and 
conceptually contradictory ones (e.g., a world in which 5 + 7 both does and 
does not equal 12). Morally deviant worlds were judged to be easier to 
imagine than conceptually contradictory ones, but more difficult to imagine 
than factually unlikely ones (Barnes & Black, 2016), suggesting that the 
imaginative demands that engender resistance may be distinct from these 
other types of imaginative demands.
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Whereas these studies have been helpful in establishing imaginative 
resistance as an empirical reality and in describing some of its attributes, 
important questions remain about the precise nature and origins of this 
phenomenon. In response to the lack of conceptual clarity in the philoso-
phical literature on imaginative resistance, Weatherson (2004) helpfully 
identified four distinct puzzles under the umbrella of imaginative resistance: 
the imaginative puzzle, the alethic puzzle, the phenomenological puzzle, and 
the esthetic puzzle. Here, we empirically investigate imaginative resistance 
in terms of the imaginative, alethic, and phenomenological puzzles in the 
hopes of providing similar conceptual clarity to the psychological literature 
on this phenomenon, as prior work has tended to refer only to resistance in 
the broad sense (e.g., Barnes & Black, 2016).
The imaginative puzzle refers to the difficulty encountered in imagining 
that something we take to be morally unjustifiable is in fact morally justified 
within the context of a fictional narrative. This puzzle arises in explaining 
the audience’s resistance to imagining, for example, that the murder of two 
people was justified because they were standing in the middle of the road 
blocking traffic, despite the ease with which the audience can imagine such 
a scene occurring (Weatherson, 2004). The imaginative puzzle should be 
distinguished from the alethic puzzle, which is the puzzle of explaining the 
author’s inability to make morally deviant claims true within the fictional 
world in question in the same way that the author seems to be able to make 
most other claims true within that fictional world. While the author of 
a narrative can make claims about characters’ moral beliefs true within the 
world of the narrative in question, the alethic puzzle arises in that the author 
cannot make certain evaluative claims about the moral acceptability of 
characters’ actions true within the world of the narrative. So, while the 
imaginative puzzle asks why an audience generally resists imagining 
immoral actions as morally acceptable, the alethic puzzle asks why an author 
lacks the authority to reduce this resistance by explicitly claiming that the 
morally deviant action is in fact morally acceptable in the fictional world in 
question. Finally, the phenomenological puzzle involves explaining why the 
aspects of a narrative that engender imaginative resistance feel “striking, 
jarring in a way that earlier sentences are not” (Weatherson, 2004, p. 2). This 
puzzle asks why we have a particular sort of emotional response to the 
narrative’s evaluative claims regarding what we take to be moral deviance, 
while we do not have this sort of reaction to other kinds of claims about the 
world described by the narrative.
It is important to distinguish between two types of empirical questions 
these puzzles raise: first, there is the question of whether the assumption of 
each puzzle is true. That is, whether people in fact resist accepting that 
a morally deviant action is morally justified in the world of a narrative (the 
imaginative puzzle), whether this holds true when the author directly states 
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that an immoral action is morally justified in the world of the story (the 
alethic puzzle), and whether people have a specific sort of emotional reac-
tion to claims about immoral actions being morally justified (the phenom-
enological puzzle). Separate from these are the questions actually raised by 
the puzzles themselves – questions as to why people experience each of these 
imaginative difficulties. The current set of studies were designed not only to 
test whether imaginative resistance occurs as conceptualized by each puzzle, 
but also to investigate a potential explanatory mechanism for imaginative 
resistance in the form of stable individual differences in emotional 
responses, both at the general level and specifically in response to morally 
relevant actions.
We test the assumptions of the imaginative, alethic, and phenomenolo-
gical puzzles by distinguishing between three imaginative demands: (1) 
merely imagining a scene involving no immoral action, (2) imagining 
a scene in which an immoral action occurs, and (3) imagining that an 
immoral action is justified in the world of a story. Thus, whereas the sort 
of imagining referred to in demands (1) and (2) is that of imagining a scene, 
the imagining referred to in demand (3) is the engagement with a moral 
claim about the world in question. In assessing various imaginative and 
evaluative responses to each of these specific aspects of a narrative, we were 
able to clarify how imaginative resistance occurs for most people.
If imaginative resistance occurs as conceptualized by the imaginative 
puzzle, we would expect people to resist imagining immoral actions as 
morally justified without an authorial claim encouraging readers to do so. 
In other words, levels of resistance should be fairly high in response to 
demand (2), and this degree of resistance should be higher than that 
experienced in response to demand (1), which merely involves imagining 
that morally neutral events are acceptable in the world of the story. This 
serves as a test of the imaginative puzzle as it speaks to the participant’s 
resistance to imagining that a morally deviant action is acceptable, rather 
than to the author’s inability to make certain evaluative claims true within 
the world of the story.
If imaginative resistance occurs as conceptualized by the alethic puzzle, 
that is, if an author lacks the ability to make a morally deviant action morally 
justified in the world of a story, we would expect to see similar levels of 
imaginative resistance in response to demands (2) and (3); in other words, 
the addition of an evaluative claim stating that a morally deviant action is 
morally justified should make no difference to the experience of resistance. 
On the other hand, if people show lower levels of resistance when such 
a claim is present as compared to when it is absent, this would indicate that 
authors do possess some ability to make morally deviant actions morally 
acceptable in a fictional world. Importantly, we distinguish judgments about 
the moral acceptability of an action within the world of the story from 
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judgments about whether a character carrying out an immoral action in 
a story believes their actions to be moral. The alethic puzzle predicts that 
authors should be able to make other sorts of claims (for example, about the 
beliefs of a character) true despite their inability to make morally deviant 
claims true within the world of a story, and distinguishing participants’ 
judgments about a character’s beliefs from their judgments about the 
acceptability of a character’s actions allows us to test whether this indeed 
occurs.
The assumption of the phenomenological puzzle is that claims that 
engender imaginative resistance invoke stronger feelings, are felt as more 
jarring, than other claims presented in a narrative, including claims merely 
depicting but not endorsing immoral actions, and claims involving other 
strange or jarring situations that are not moral (e.g., about wooly mam-
moths terrorizing Las Vegas, etc.). More broadly construed, the phenom-
enological puzzle can be seen as asking what the role of emotion is in the 
phenomenon of imaginative resistance, which brings us to the other central 
goal in the current set of studies.
We sought to explore why it is that individuals experience imaginative 
resistance by taking an individual differences perspective. Specifically, we 
tested whether differences in how people tend to emotionally respond to 
their environments would account for differences in the extent to which 
people resist imagining morally counterfactual worlds. The findings of 
Barnes and Black (2016) suggest that imaginative resistance to imagining 
morally counterfactual worlds is distinct from the sorts of difficulties that 
arise when attempting to imagine conceptually impossible worlds. As 
opposed to being driven purely by conceptual difficulties, we propose that 
the extent to which one experiences imaginative resistance to imagining 
morally counterfactual worlds may instead be closely related to the negative 
emotions elicited by being asked to imagine that a morally deviant action is 
in fact morally commendable. While there is a great deal of work on 
emotional engagement with fiction (e.g., Currie, 1995; Feagin, 1996; Hjort 
& Laver, 1997; Meskin & Weinberg, 2003; Radford et al., 1975; Walton, 
2006) and the importance of emotion in judgments of morally deviant 
actions (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006), there has been 
relatively little work considering imaginative resistance as an emotional 
phenomenon. Recent work in which an individual difference measure of 
imaginative resistance was developed showed that scores on this scale were 
positively related to traits such as disgust sensitivity and concerns about 
moral purity, which the authors took as proxies for fears about moral 
contagion (i.e., that merely entertaining a deviant moral norm might lead 
one to internalize it; Black & Barnes, 2017). Whereas these findings are 
suggestive of a broader role of emotional reactivity in fostering greater levels 
of imaginative resistance, these questions have yet to be tested.
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A central finding from the past two decades of empirical work in moral 
psychology is that people have an emotional aversion to performing harm 
(Blair, 1995; Greene et al., 2001; Haidt, 2001; Mikhail, 2007). It is possible 
that imaginative resistance involves a similar emotional aversion to imagin-
ing harm, specifically imaginatively considering harm as morally acceptable. 
We investigate the potential role of emotion in imaginative resistance in 
Studies 2–3 by assessing variations in imaginative responses to the sort of 
scenarios that engender imaginative resistance as they relate to variability in 
three facets of stable individual differences in the experience of emotion: the 
valence and extremity of emotional responses to immoral actions (which we 
subsequently refer to simply as “affect”), trait psychopathy, and trait anxiety. 
These traits were selected due to their relationships with harm aversion; 
higher levels of anxiety tend to predict greater aversion to harm (Perkins 
et al., 2013) whereas higher levels of psychopathy predict less aversion to 
harm (Patil, 2015; Pletti et al., 2017). If imagining harm and imagining harm 
as morally justified rely on similar psychological processes, we would expect 
resistance to be greater for those higher in anxiety and lower in psycho-
pathy. We expected that those who experienced more negative affect in 
response to reading about harmful events would show similar patterns of 
responses as low-psychopathy, high-anxiety individuals. Thus, the three 
measures selected were expected to be related to one another and to broadly 
allow us to distinguish between individuals low in emotional reactivity 
(more positive affect, higher psychopathy, lower anxiety) versus individuals 
high in emotional reactivity (more negative affect, lower psychopathy, 
higher anxiety).
Study 1
The aim of Study 1 was to examine the assumptions of the imaginative and 
alethic puzzles by determining which imaginative demands are responsible 
for engendering resistance. In order to do so, we presented participants with 
one of three types of vignettes that build cumulatively upon each other and 
correspond to the three types of imaginative demands described above: 
those without immoral actions (the Setup condition), those featuring 
immoral actions (Immoral Action condition), and those featuring an 
immoral action with an evaluative claim from the author endorsing that 
immoral action as morally justified in the world of the narrative (the Moral 
Evaluation condition).
If imaginative resistance operates as conceived by the imaginative puzzle, 
we would expect to find that participants resist imagining harmful actions as 
morally acceptable in the Immoral Action condition in a way that is not true 
for the morally neutral actions of the Setup condition. If imaginative 
resistance operates as conceived by the alethic puzzle, we would expect to 
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find similarly high levels of resistance in the Moral Evaluation condition, 
despite the presence of an evaluative claim, indicating an author’s inability 
to make morally deviant claims true within the world of the narrative. We 
will also investigate the effect of this manipulation on participant’s judg-
ments about whether the perpetrator of harm described in the vignette 
believes their actions to be morally justified to distinguish judgments 
about moral truths in the world of the story from other types of judgments 
which might be influenced an evaluative claim.
Method
Participants
To determine a priori sample size, a pilot study was conducted mirroring the 
procedures detailed below and finding an omnibus effect of our experimen-
tal manipulation on one of our central dependent measures (harmfulness 
ratings) of η2P= .12. A power analysis using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) 
indicated that the necessary sample size to detect an effect of this size with 
99% power was N = 162. Thus, we planned to collect at least this many 
participants in the full study. A total of N = 202 participants were recruited 
via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) in return for 1.67 USD. Of these, 
five participants were excluded from analyses for providing incomplete or 
no data, and 21 participants were excluded for failing an attention check, 
leaving a final sample size of N = 176 (mean age = 35.20, SD = 9.82; 47.2% 
women). All experimental materials and data for this study are available at 
https://osf.io/q3xvj/.
Procedure
Participants were recruited for a study on social decision-making and were 
told that they would be reading a series of short stories and answering 
a series of questions after each story. All participants were presented with 
a series of seven vignettes presented in randomized order, with the specific 
content of these vignettes being determined by each participant’s random 
assignment into one of three between-subjects experimental conditions. 
Participants were instructed to read each vignette carefully and imagine 
the events being described to them. In the Setup condition, these vignettes 
described only the initial details of a scene in which the central actor did not 
themselves carry out any specific moral action in response to the events 
described (e.g., “While driving on the freeway, Craig encountered a long 
traffic jam. Craig got out of his car to investigate the cause of the traffic. 
After walking alongside the road for a few hundred yards, Craig saw that 
a couple, Jack and Jill, were arguing in the middle of the freeway, and this 
was what was causing the traffic jam.”) In the Immoral Action condition, 
these vignettes consisted of the same information in the Setup condition 
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with the addition of a severe harmful action carried out by the central actor 
in response to the events in the narrative (e.g., “Craig walked back to his car 
and grabbed the gun that he kept inside his glove box. He then walked back 
to where the couple was arguing and shot and killed both Jack and Jill. The 
motorists on the freeway began driving over Jack and Jill’s dead bodies, 
ending the traffic jam.”) In the Moral Evaluation condition, these vignettes 
consisted of the information comprising the Setup and Immoral Action 
conditions, with the addition of a final, evaluative statement made by the 
narrator indicating that the harm carried out was a morally acceptable 
response to the situation (e.g., “Killing Jack and Jill was the right thing for 
Craig to do; after all, Jack and Jill were causing traffic by arguing in the 
freeway.”) The Moral Evaluation condition was intended to mirror the types 
of narratives used in the philosophical literature to evoke imaginative 
resistance. After each of the seven scenarios, participants provided 
responses to a series of 15 items that served as the dependent measures in 
this study. At the end of the study, participants provided basic demographic 
information and were debriefed and thanked for their time.
Materials
Moral vignettes. The seven moral vignettes provided to participants were 
a combination of vignettes pulled from the literatures on imaginative 
resistance and moral judgment (Weatherson, 2004) and novel vignettes 
created by the experimenters for the purposes of this research. The full 
(Moral Evaluation) versions of these vignettes described acts of severe 
violence (e.g., shooting, stabbing, drowning, beating with a hammer) carried 
out by an actor in response to a range of situations precipitating this 
violence (e.g., the actor being turned away at a liquor store for not having 
their ID on them, the actor not being able to financially support their 
newborn baby, the actor learning that their daughter committed incest 
many years ago). After the full vignettes were prepared, passages were 
removed from them according to the experimental condition that they 
would be presented in (i.e., Setup, Immoral Action, Moral Evaluation). 
The full text of these vignettes is included in the Supplemental Materials.
Dependent measures. Participants responded to a set of 15 items after 
reading and imagining each moral vignette. Two items measured the 
perceived harmfulness and moral acceptability of the action described 
and, after reverse-scoring the harmfulness item, were formed into 
a composite measure with higher scores representing more positive 
moral judgments (“Morality”; Spearman-Brown r = .78). Single items 
adapted from prior work (Liao et al., 2014) examined distinct aspects of 
imaginative resistance, asking participants whether the actor did the right 
thing in the world of the story (“World Right”) and how easy it was to 
imagine that what the actor had done was morally acceptable 
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(“Imaginability”). To distinguish imaginative resistance from participants’ 
beliefs about actors’ mental states, one item measured participants’ agree-
ment that the actor in the story believed they did the right thing (“Belief 
Right”).
While these four variables served as our central measures of interest, we 
additionally collected three ratings of how vividly participants had imagined 
the actual scenes described to them (from which a composite was created, 
“Vividness”; α= .85) and administered the six-item Transportation Scale- 
Short Form (TS-SF; Appel et al., 2015), which measures the degree to which 
participants become immersed in the world of a narrative described to them 
(“Transportation”; α= .83). These measures were included to explore 
whether the type of semantic imagining involved in imaginative resistance 
would be related to imagination in the episodic sense (i.e., that involving 
scene imagery) or the extent to which one is engaged with a narrative more 
broadly. Participants additionally completed one free-response item asking 
them to elaborate further on their answers to the Imaginability item, though 
these responses were not analyzed and will not be discussed further here. All 
items were measured on 7-point Likert scales (e.g., 1 = not at all to 7 = very 
much). Ratings were collapsed across the seven vignettes provided to parti-
cipants. Full wording for these items is included in the supplemental 
materials.
Results
To determine how the contents of the narrative influenced subsequent 
judgments related to different aspects of imaginative resistance, we con-
ducted one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with condition (Setup vs. 
Immoral Action vs. Moral Evaluation) as a between-subjects independent 
variable and the mean rating of interest (e.g., Morality, Imaginability, etc.) 
as the dependent variable (see Figure 1). Where statistically significant 
omnibus effects of condition were found, we proceeded by testing for 
pairwise condition differences. For these follow-up tests, we report 
Bonferonni-corrected p-values (i.e., multiplying observed p-values by 
three, the total number of comparisons being made). For our four central 
dependent measures, we additionally provide Cohen’s ds for condition 
differences (presented in the text) as well as those representing the distance 
of mean ratings in each condition from the scale’s midpoint to provide an 
absolute sense of where participants fell on our ratings scales (Table 1). 
Correlations amongst all dependent measures in Study 1 can be found in 
Table S2 in the Supplemental Materials.
Condition Differences in Moral Judgments and Imaginative 
Resistance. For the one-way ANOVA using Morality as the dependent 
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p < .001, η2p = .69. Bonferonni-corrected post-hoc tests revealed that 
Morality ratings were higher in the Setup condition (M = 4.55, SD = 0.71) 
than in both the Immoral Action (M = 1.72, SD = 1.02), t(112) = 16.60, p < 
.001, d = 3.22, and the Moral Evaluation condition (M = 1.52, SD = 0.87), t 
(109) = 19.63, p < .001, d = 3.82. Ratings did not significantly differ between 
the Immoral Action and Moral Evaluation conditions, t(125) = 1.16, p 
= .747, d = 0.21.
Using World Right as the dependent variable, a significant effect of 
condition was found, F(2, 173) = 28.94, p < .001, η2p = .25. Post-hoc tests 
revealed that World Right ratings were higher in the Setup condition (M 
= 4.38, SD = 1.08) as compared to both the Immoral Action condition (M 
= 2.15, SD = 1.71), t(112) = 8.01, p < .001, d = 1.56, and the Moral Evaluation 
condition (M = 2.61, SD = 1.83), t(109) = 6.02, p < .001, d = 1.18. However, 
World Right ratings did not differ between the Immoral Action and Moral 
Evaluation conditions, t(125) = −1.45, p = .449, d = 0.26.
Using Imaginability as the dependent variable, a significant effect of 
condition was found, F(2, 173) = 63.12, p < .001, η2p = .42. Post-hoc tests 
revealed that Imaginability ratings were higher in the Setup condition (M 
= 4.89, SD = 1.06) as compared to both the Immoral Action condition (M 
= 2.07, SD = 1.67), t(112) = 10.34, p < .001, d = 2.02, and the Moral 
Evaluation condition (M = 2.06, SD = 1.58), t(109) = 10.72, p < .001, 
d = 2.10. However, Imaginability ratings did not differ between the 
Immoral Action and Moral Evaluation conditions, t(125) = 0.01, p = 1.00, 
d = 0.01.
Using Belief Right as the dependent variable, a significant effect of con-
dition was found,F(2, 173) = 12.72, p < .001, η2p = .13. Post-hoc tests 
revealed that Belief Right ratings were higher in the Moral Evaluation 
Table 1. Effect sizes (Cohen’s d) representing the dis-
tance of the mean rating within each condition from 
the scale midpoint in Study 1. Positive numbers indi-
cate number of standard deviations above the scale 
midpoint, whereas negative numbers indicate number 
of standard deviations below the scale midpoint.














condition (M = 5.79, SD = 1.35) as compared to both the Setup condition (M 
= 5.09, SD = 0.93), t(109) = 3.10, p = .008, d = 0.60, and the Immoral Action 
condition (M = 4.62, SD = 1.49), t(125) = 4.61, p < .001, d = 0.82. Belief Right 
ratings did not differ between the Setup and Immoral Action conditions, t 
(112) = 1.91, p = .176, d = 0.38.
Exploratory Analyses. One-way ANOVAs on ratings of Vividness, F(2, 
173) = 2.13, p = .122, η2P = .02, and Transportation, F(2, 173) = 2.39, p = .095, 
η2P = .03, did not show significant effects of condition. Thus, we did not 
explore pairwise differences for these two measures.
Discussion
Study 1 provides support for the existence of imaginative resistance as 
conceptualized by both the imaginative and alethic puzzles. In line with 
the imaginative puzzle, people showed high levels of resistance to imagining 
that a harmful action could be morally acceptable; ratings for World Right 
and Imaginability were near floor in the Immoral Action condition (Table 
1), and significantly lower than those in the baseline Setup condition in 
which no harmful action had taken place. Our results also demonstrate 
evidence of imaginative resistance in line with the alethic puzzle: the addi-
tion of the authorial evaluative claim in the Moral Evaluation condition did 
not significantly increase people’s ability to imagine a morally deviant action 
as morally commendable (as indicated by the lack of significant differences 
in World Right and Imaginability ratings between the Immoral Action and 
Moral Evaluation conditions), however it did increase perceptions that the 
harmful actor believed their actions to be morally right. Thus, whereas 
authors appear unable to influence the truth of a moral claim within 
a fictional world, they are able to influence perceptions of characters’ mental 
states regarding moral claims.
Study 2
In Study 2, we sought to replicate our results from Study 1 and to examine 
whether individual differences in emotion predict the level of imaginative 
resistance a person experiences similarly to the way that emotion predicts 
levels of harm aversion. To do so, we collected ratings of emotional valence 
(i.e., negative to positive) and intensity in response to the vignettes read by 
participants (“affect”, with higher ratings indicating more positive emo-
tional responses to the vignettes). We also measured individual differences 
in traits believed to reflect high emotional reactivity (anxiety) and low 
emotional reactivity (psychopathy) in response to harm. If imaginative 
resistance at least partially reflects an emotional resistance to entertaining 
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the mere notion that harm could be morally acceptable, we would expect 
that variance in emotional reactivity would predict variance in resistance: 
those who display higher levels of psychopathy may be expected to experi-
ence less resistance because of flat affect, while those who display higher 
levels of anxiety may be expected to experience more resistance because of 
increased sensitivity.
In addition to exploring emotion in the broad sense, the experimental 
design used here allowed us to test whether emotion relates to imaginative 
resistance in a different way based on whether it is conceived in terms of 
the imaginative puzzle or alethic puzzle. If emotion is connected to the 
imaginative puzzle, we would expect higher levels of anxiety and lower 
levels of psychopathy and affect to predict greater resistance (i.e., lower 
World Right and Imaginability ratings) in the Immoral Action condition 
in a way that is untrue in the Setup condition. However, these trait 
differences in emotion may also influence how the evaluative claim in 
the Moral Evaluation condition is received (i.e., the alethic puzzle). 
Specifically, it is possible that the traits predicting lower levels of imagi-
native resistance as conceptualized by the imaginative puzzle would also 
predict greater willingness to accept the author’s evaluative claim about 
a morally deviant action. That is, these traits could predict lower levels of 
resistance as conceptualized by the alethic puzzle. For example, whereas 
psychopathy might predict higher imaginability ratings in the Immoral 
Action condition (i.e., showing that emotion plays a role in the imagina-
tive puzzle), this relationship might be even stronger in the Moral 
Evaluation condition in which the author endorses the morally deviant 
action, which would suggest that low affect plays a role in diminishing 
resistance as conceptualized by the alethic puzzle. Testing for interaction 
effects between condition and trait emotion levels in this way allows us to 
determine whether emotion plays a role in the alethic puzzle.
Method
Participants
As our goal in Study 2 was partially to replicate the findings of Study 1, we 
aimed to achieve the same statistical power as that achieved in Study 1. 
Thus, we again made the a priori plan to recruit at least N = 162 participants. 
A total of N = 201 participants were recruited via Amazon’s MTurk in 
return for 2.50 USD. Of these, five participants were excluded from analyses 
for providing incomplete or no data, and 29 participants were excluded for 
failing an attention check, leaving us with a final sample of N = 167 (mean 
age = 35.27, SD = 11.23; 34.7% women). All experimental materials and data 
for this study are available at https://osf.io/q3xvj/.
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Procedure
The procedure for this study mirrored that of Study 1 with several additions. 
First, participants provided ratings on two additional items (Affect and 
Realism, described below) after reading each of the seven moral scenarios. 
Second, participants completed self-report measures of trait psychopathy 
and trait anxiety (with the order in which these two scales were completed 
being randomized for each participant) after having read and rated the 
seven moral vignettes and before providing demographic information.
Materials
Moral vignettes and dependent measures. The moral vignettes presented 
to participants were the same as those used in Study 1. Participants 
responded to 17 total items after each vignette: the same 15 items used in 
Study 1, and two additional items measuring how good or bad the stories 
made the participants feel, with higher scores representing more positive 
emotional responses to the stories (“Affect”), and how likely it is that an 
event similar to the one they had just read about would occur in the real 
world (“Realism”; as we did not incorporate this measure into subsequent 
analyses, however, it will not be discussed further). These ratings were 
collapsed across the seven vignettes used. We again formed composites for 
Morality (Spearman-Brown r = .76), Vividness (α= .86), and Transportation 
(α= .86).
Trait psychopathy and anxiety. Trait psychopathy was measured using 
the 56-item Psychopathic Personality Inventory-Short Form (PPI-SF; 
Lilienfeld & Hess, 2001). The PPI-SF has shown good reliability in prior 
work (Mullins-Nelson et al., 2006) and is highly correlated with the full, 
187-item version of the PPI (Lilienfeld & Hess, 2001). This scale indexes 
both primary (e.g., social potency, coldheartedness, stress immunity) and 
secondary (e.g., Machiavellian egocentricity, blame externalization) trait 
psychopathy by providing personality descriptors (e.g., “I feel bad about 
myself after I tell a lie”) and asking participants to rate how false or true the 
statement is of them on a 4-point scale (1 = false; 2 = mostly false; 3 = mostly 
true; 4 = true). Internal consistency in the current sample for the PPI-SF was 
high (α ¼ .90) and thus a composite (mean) psychopathy score was used in 
subsequent analyses after reverse-coding appropriate items. Higher ratings 
on this scale represented higher levels of trait psychopathy.
Trait anxiety was measured using the 39-item Welsh Anxiety Scale (WAS; 
Welsh, 1956). Similarly to the PPI-SF, this scale presents personality 
descriptors (e.g., “Criticism or scolding hurts me terribly”) and asks parti-
cipants whether the statement is true or false of them on a 2-point scale (1 = 
true; 2 = false). The WAS assesses five clusters of anxiety-related symptoms: 
decreased mental efficiency, negative emotional tone, pessimism and loss of 
energy, interpersonal oversensitivity, and schizoid mentation). Items of this 
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scale were reverse-scored such that higher scores would indicate greater 
levels of trait anxiety. Internal consistency in the current sample for the 
WAS was high (α ¼ .94) and thus a composite (mean) anxiety score was 
used in subsequent analyses.
Results
To determine whether the patterns of Morality, World Right, Imaginability, 
and Belief Right ratings across the three conditions mirrored those found in 
Study 1, we conducted a series of one-way ANOVAs with accompanying 
Bonferonni-corrected post-hoc tests where significant omnibus effects were 
found (see Figure 2). Following this, we tested a series of hierarchical 
regression models enabling us to determine whether our three indices of 
emotional reactivity (Affect, Psychopathy, and Anxiety) predicted scores on 
these dependent variables (both independently and interactively with con-
dition; full results of these analyses are available in Tables S5-S16 in the 
Supplemental Materials). Correlations amongst all measures can be found 
in Table S3 in the Supplemental Materials.
Condition differences in moral judgments and imaginative resistance
One-way ANOVAs using Morality, World Right, Imaginability, Belief 
Right, Vividness, and Transportation as dependent variables replicated the 
pattern of results from Study 1 exactly (see Figure 2). For brevity, we have 
included the full writeup of these analyses in the Supplemental Materials.
Moderation by affect, psychopathy, and anxiety
We next explored whether individual differences in emotion predicted 
Morality, World Right, Imaginability, and Belief Right ratings both inde-
pendently and interactively with experimental condition. For these analyses, 
condition was dummy-coded into three variables that allowed us to examine 
all pairwise comparisons and interactions between the individual difference 
measure in question (Affect, PPI-SF, or WAS scores) and condition for each 
of these pairs. One pair of dummy variables used Setup as the reference 
group, and another pair used Immoral Action as the reference group, with 
this latter pair allowing us to examine the pairwise comparison not obtained 
by the first (Moral Evaluation vs. Immoral Action). Thus, for each depen-
dent variable analyzed, two regression models were tested, each using one 
pair of these dummy variables and their accompanying interaction terms.
Dummy-coded condition variables and mean-centered trait emotion 
scores were entered into hierarchical regression models at the first step, 
and their interaction terms were entered at the second step. When 
a significant amount of variance was explained by the addition of the 










































































































































































































16 D. CAMPBELL ET AL.
of the relationship between the individual difference measure and the 
dependent variable of interest across experimental conditions and note 
which of these interactions were statistically significant in the overall regres-
sion model.
Moderation by Affect. We first explored whether participants’ Affect 
ratings (i.e., the valence and extremity of their emotional responses to the 
seven vignettes) moderated the relationship between condition and ratings 
of Morality, World Right, Imaginability, and Belief Right. The effect of 
condition on Morality ratings was moderated by Affect, ΔF(2, 161) = 
25.96, p < .001, ΔR2= .07 (see Figure 3). Whereas Affect did not significantly 
predict Morality ratings in the Setup condition (b = −0.11, p = .082), it 
significantly positively predicted Morality ratings in the Immoral Action 
condition (b = 0.46, p < .001) and the Moral Evaluation condition (b = 0.53, 
p < .001). The difference in the strength of this relationship between the 
Immoral Action and Moral Evaluation conditions was nonsignificant, b = 
0.07, p = .460.
The relationship between Condition and World Right ratings was also 
significantly moderated by Affect, ΔF(2, 161) = 6.45, p = .002, ΔR2= .03 
(see Figure 4). Whereas Affect showed a significant positive relationship 
with World Right ratings in the Setup condition (b = 0.40, p < .001), this 
relationship was significantly stronger in both the Immoral Action (b = 
0.70, p < .001) and Moral Evaluation conditions (b = 0.91, p < .001). The 
difference in the strength of this relationship between the Immoral 
Action and Moral Evaluation conditions was nonsignificant, b = 0.22, 
p = .103.
The relationship between Condition and Imaginability ratings were also 
moderated by Affect, ΔF(2, 161) = 9.88, p < .001, ΔR2= .03 (see Figure 5). 
Whereas Affect showed a significant positive relationship with Imaginability 
ratings in the Setup condition (b = 0.30, p < .001), this relationship was 
significantly stronger in both the Immoral Action (b = 0.69, p < .001) and 
Moral Evaluation conditions (b = 0.81, p < .001). The difference in the 
strength of this relationship between the Immoral Action and Moral 
Evaluation conditions was nonsignificant, b = 0.12, p = .274.
Finally, a nonsignificant amount of variance explained at Step 2 of our 
hierarchical regression model indicated that the relationship between Affect 
and Belief Right ratings did not significantly differ across the three experi-
mental conditions, ΔF(2, 161) = 0.55, p = .580, ΔR2= .01. Additionally, Affect 
did not predict Belief Right ratings independently of condition, b = 0.19, 
p = .089.
Moderation by Trait Psychopathy. A one-way ANOVA using scores on 
the PPI-SF (M = 2.13, SD = 0.38) confirmed that these scores did not 
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.757, η2p = .00, indicating that our experimental manipulation did not 
influence participants’ PPI-SF scores. We explored whether PPI-SF scores 
moderated the relationship between experimental condition and ratings of 
Morality, World Right, Imaginability, and Belief Right. The effect of condi-
tion on Morality ratings was moderated by psychopathy, ΔF(2, 161) = 15.43, 
p < .001, ΔR2= .05 (see Figure 6). Whereas psychopathy did not predict 
Morality ratings in the Setup condition (b = −0.21, p = .418), psychopathy 
was positively related to Morality in both the Immoral Action condition (b = 
2.23, p < .001) and to a significantly lesser degree in the Moral Evaluation 
condition (b = 1.32, p < .001).
Condition effects on World Right were also moderated by psychopathy, 
ΔF(2, 161) = 4.47, p = .013, ΔR2= .03 (see Figure 7). Whereas psychopathy 
was positively related to World Right ratings in the Setup condition (b = 
0.97, p = .003), this relationship was significantly stronger in the positive 
direction in the Immoral Action condition (b = 3.06, p < .001). This 
relationship was also significant and positive in the Moral Evaluation con-
dition (b = 2.11, p = .001), though not significantly different in strength from 
either of the other two conditions.
Condition effects on Imaginability were also moderated by psychopathy, 















World Right by Affect
Negative Affect
Positive Affect
Figure 4. Mean ratings of world right in each of the three experimental conditions (setup, 
immoral action, moral evaluation) for negative affect (i.e., lower scores) and positive affect (i.e., 
higher scores) participants in Study 2. Participants were classified into these categories via 
median split. Ratings are collapsed across the seven moral vignettes presented. Error bars 
represent � 1 SEM.
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was positively related to Imaginability ratings in the Setup condition (b = 
0.69, p = .048), this relationship was significantly stronger in the positive 
direction in the Immoral Action condition (b = 2.92, p < .001) and in the 
Moral Evaluation condition (b = 2.27, p < .001). The strength of this 
relationship did not significantly differ between the Immoral Action and 
Moral Evaluation conditions.
Finally, for Belief Right ratings, a nonsignificant amount of variance 
explained at Step 2 of our regression model indicated that the relationship 
between psychopathy and Belief Right ratings did not significantly differ 
across the three experimental conditions, ΔF(2, 161) = 2.82, p = .062, ΔR2= 
.03. Additionally, psychopathy did not predict Belief Right ratings indepen-
dently of condition, b = 0.38, p = .407.
Moderation by Trait Anxiety. A one-way ANOVA using scores on the 
WAS (2-point scale; M = 1.40, SD = 0.27) confirmed that these scores did 
not significantly differ between experimental conditions, F(2, 164) = 0.17, 
p = .843, η2p = .00, indicating that our manipulation did not influence 
participants’ WAS scores. The effect of condition on Morality ratings was 
moderated by anxiety, ΔF(2, 161) = 8.37, p < .001, ΔR2= .04 (see Figure 9). 
Whereas anxiety negatively predicted Morality ratings in the Setup condi-
tion (b = −0.74, p = .031), it positively predicted these ratings in both the 


















Figure 5. Mean ratings of imaginability in each of the three experimental conditions (setup, 
immoral action, moral evaluation) for negative affect (i.e., lower scores) and positive affect (i.e., 
higher scores) participants in Study 2. Participants were classified into these categories via 
median split. Ratings are collapsed across the seven moral vignettes presented. Error bars 
represent � 1 SEM.
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condition (b = 1.26, p = .004). The strength of this positive relationship did 
not significantly differ between these two conditions.
Condition effects on World Right were also moderated by anxiety, ΔF(2, 
161) = 3.13, p = .046, ΔR2= .03 (see Figure 10). Whereas anxiety did not 
predict World Right ratings in the Setup condition (b = 0.60, p = .189), it 
significantly positively predicted these ratings in both the Immoral Action 
condition (b = 3.10, p = .002) and the Moral Evaluation condition (b = 2.77, 
p = .001). Again, the Immoral Action and Moral Evaluation conditions did 
not significantly differ in the strength of this relationship.
Imaginability ratings were also moderated by anxiety, ΔF(2, 161) = 5.53, 
p = .005, ΔR2= .04 (see Figure 11). Following the same pattern as World 
Right ratings, anxiety did not predict Imaginability ratings in the Setup 
condition (b = 0.70, p = .885), but significantly positively predicted 
Imaginability ratings in both the Immoral Action (b = 3.48, p < .001) and 
Moral Evaluation conditions (b = 1.89, p = .003) with a strength that did not 
significantly differ between these two conditions.
Finally, a nonsignificant amount of variance explained at Step 2 of our 
regression model indicated that the relationship between anxiety and Belief 
Right ratings did not significantly differ across the three experimental 
















Figure 6. Mean ratings of morality in each of the three experimental conditions (setup, immoral 
action, moral evaluation) for Low Psychopathy (i.e., lower scores on the PPI-SF) and high 
psychopathy (i.e., higher scores on the PPI-SF) participants in Study 2. Participants were 
classified into these categories via median split. Ratings are collapsed across the seven moral 
vignettes presented. Error bars represent � 1 SEM.
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did not predict Belief Right ratings independently of condition, b = 0.00, 
p = .999.
Discussion
In Study 2 we witnessed the same pattern of condition differences seen in 
Study 1: ratings of Morality, Imaginability, and World Right were similarly 
low across both the Immoral Action and Moral Evaluation conditions, 
indicating that participants resist imagining harm as morally acceptable in 
the world of a story (in line with the imaginative puzzle) regardless of the 
presence of an authorial evaluative claim (in line with the alethic puzzle).
Expanding on the findings from Study 1, we found that all three indivi-
dual difference measures of emotion significantly positively predicted moral 
judgments and levels of imaginative resistance similarly across both the 
Immoral Action and Moral Evaluation conditions, but not in the baseline 
Setup condition that did not feature any harmful action. In other words, 
participants higher in affect, psychopathy, or anxiety rated harmful actions 
as more acceptable and easier to imagine as acceptable in the world of the 
story, supporting a role for emotion in the imaginative puzzle. However, the 
fact that the strength of these relationships did not differ on the basis of the 















World Right by Psychopathy
Low Psychopathy
High Psychopathy
Figure 7. Mean ratings of world right in each of the three experimental conditions (setup, 
immoral action, moral evaluation) for low psychopathy (i.e., lower scores on the PPI-SF) and 
high psychopathy (i.e., higher scores on the PPI-SF) participants in Study 2. Participants were 
classified into these categories via median split. Ratings are collapsed across the seven moral 
vignettes presented. Error bars represent � 1 SEM.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































tended to be higher in the Moral Evaluation condition independently of trait 
emotion tells us that the alethic puzzle (i.e., the extent to which the author’s 
evaluative claim influences resistance) is not attenuated by trait emotional 
responsiveness.
The results related to affect and psychopathy were in line with our predic-
tion that the lower levels of emotional reactivity associated with these traits 
would predict a greater ability or willingness to imagine harms as morally 
acceptable. However, the results for trait anxiety deviated from this pattern; 
instead of high-anxiety individuals experiencing higher levels of imaginative 
resistance (in line with the notion that these individuals, who tend to be harm 
averse, would also be averse to imagining harms as morally acceptable), they 
instead judged the acceptability of imagined harmful actions similarly to those 
high in affect and psychopathy. It could be the case that the relationship 
between anxiety and imaginative resistance operates via a different mechan-
ism than that of psychopathy and affect. For example, high-anxiety individuals 
tended to imagine harms slightly less vividly to begin with, whereas vividness 
was unrelated to affect and psychopathy (see Table S3). Imagining harms in 
less vivid detail might suppress tendencies to rate harms as immoral and resist 
imagining them as moral. This would be in line with findings that vivid scene 
imagery supports greater harm aversion (Amit & Greene, 2012). Alternatively, 
this pattern of results may have been due to the specific anxiety measure used 
here (the WAS; Welsh, 1956), which has been argued by some to capture 


















Figure 11. Mean ratings of imaginability in each of the three experimental conditions (setup, 
immoral action, moral evaluation) for low anxiety (i.e., lower scores on the WAS) and high 
anxiety (i.e., higher scores on the WAS) participants in Study 2. Participants were classified into 
these categories via median split. Ratings are collapsed across the seven moral vignettes 
presented. Error bars represent � 1 SEM.
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2000). Such general maladjustment may be similar to elements of psychopathy 
and thus predict lower levels of imaginative resistance. Ultimately, further 
research would be needed to unpack and explain these counterintuitive 
findings related to trait anxiety and for now, we reserve further discussion 
of this finding until determining whether it replicates in our final study.
Study 3
In Studies 1–2, we tested and provided support for the assumptions of the 
imaginative and alethic puzzles and a general role for individual differences 
in the experience of emotion in accounting for variability in levels of imagi-
native resistance. However, there were two limitations in these studies that 
we sought to address in a final, pre-registered study (https://aspredicted.org/ 
blind.php?x=zk3q9d). First, the vignettes used in these studies exclusively 
featured high-severity harms (e.g., acts of killing and maiming). Due to this 
extremity, ratings on several key measures (e.g., World Right, Imaginability) 
were fairly close to the lower limit of our scale in the Immoral Action and 
Moral Evaluation conditions, which potentially prevented us from finding 
significant differences between these two conditions that may have existed. 
As this would have implications for the way we interpreted our results with 
regard to the alethic puzzle, we created new vignettes featuring a broader 
spectrum of harm, ranging from low-severity emotional harms (e.g., mocking 
someone in public) to the types of high-severity harms previously included 
(although we also note that findings against the assumption of the alethic 
puzzle would have resulted in higher rather than lower Imaginability and 
World Right ratings in the Moral Evaluation condition in Studies 1–2).
Second, several dependent measures in Studies 1–2 asked participants 
simply to rate “the action described” as opposed to making specific 
reference to the harmful action described in the vignette. Whereas this 
was done so that equivalent wording could be used across all three 
conditions (including the Setup condition, where no harmful action 
occurred), this may have created unwanted ambiguities in how partici-
pants interpreted these questions across conditions. To address this, we 
altered the wording of these items to refer specifically to the harmful 
action described in the vignette just read by participants and dropped 
the Setup condition from our design.
Method
Participants
Using G*Power, we conducted an a priori power analysis for our central 
analyses of interest (testing the statistical significance of individual regres-
sion coefficients in a model with three predictors). This analysis indicated 
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that 210 participants would be needed to detect a regression coefficient with 
an effect size of f 2 = .06 (a small-to-medium effect) with 95% power. A total 
of N = 260 participants were recruited via Amazon’s MTurk in return for 
2.50 USD. Of these, 10 participants were excluded for failing an attention 
check, and 40 participants were excluded for providing free-response data 
indicative of a lack of attention or careless responding (i.e., those who did 
not respond to the prompt as instructed). These pre-registered exclusion 
criteria were applied throughout the process of data collection and thus our 
final sample consisted of exactly N = 210 participants (mean age = 37.76, 
SD = 10.72; 44.8% women). All experimental materials and data for this 
study are available at https://osf.io/q3xvj/.
Procedure
The procedure for this study mirrored that of Study 2 with the major change 
being that participants were now randomly assigned to one of two (as 
opposed to three) between-subjects conditions: the Immoral Action condi-
tion, in which participants read vignettes describing a harmful action, or the 
Moral Evaluation condition, which mirrored the Immoral Action condition 
but concluded with an authorial statement endorsing the harmful action as 
morally justified (“[Harmful action] was the right thing for [actor] to do; 
after all . . . ”). Here, we sought specifically to explore potential differences 
between the Immoral Action and Moral Evaluation conditions and thus did 
not include the Setup condition that was present in earlier studies. This 
change in design also allowed for greater experimental control, as the only 
detail varying between conditions was now the presence vs. absence of the 
evaluative claim justifying the actor’s behavior that appeared in the Moral 
Evaluation condition. The remainder of the changes dealt with alterations to 
study materials and are thus described in depth below.
Materials
Moral vignettes. The vignettes used in Studies 1–2 featured only extreme 
harms (i.e., acts of killing and/or maiming) and hence, tended to produce 
fairly extreme ratings on our focal dependent measures (e.g., moral accept-
ability, imaginability). To address this concern, we developed several new 
vignettes by adapting scenarios from the moral psychological literature 
(Clifford et al., 2015; Parkinson et al., 2011). These vignettes were designed 
to match the format of those used in Studies 1–2 but featured less severe 
physical harms (e.g., slapping, punching) as well as emotional harms (e.g., 
being publicly mocked). Pretesting with these new vignettes confirmed that 
the harms described were perceived by participants as less severe and more 
morally acceptable than the vignettes previously used (pretest data is avail-
able at https://osf.io/v3cyw/). We combined three new vignettes with two of 
the vignettes used in Studies 1–2 to create a final set of five vignettes varying 
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substantially in perceived harmfulness (in the current sample, mean 
responses to the item “In your opinion, how harmful was it for [perpetrator 
of harm] to [harmful action]?” rated on a scale from 1 = not at all harmful to 
7 = extremely harmful ranged from 4.74 to 6.72).
Dependent and trait measures. Participants responded to the same 
set of 17 items as in Studies 1–2 with one significant alteration. 
Previously, several key items asked participants to make ratings simply 
about “the action described” (e.g., “In your opinion, how morally 
acceptable was the action described?”). However, as the Setup condi-
tion was removed in Study 3, these items now made reference to the 
specific harmful action carried out to avoid any potential ambiguity in 
the interpretation of these items (e.g., “In your opinion, how morally 
acceptable was it for Francis to punch Alex?”) Additionally, the word-
ing of the imaginability item was altered slightly in this study to more 
closely match prior work using this item (Liao et al., 2014). As in the 
prior studies, ratings were collapsed across the five vignettes and 
composites were formed for Vividness (α= .82) and Transportation 
(α= .89). As the items making up the Morality composite (moral 
acceptability and harmfulness) used in Studies 1–2 had a relatively 
low Spearman-Brown correlation (r = −.57), we analyzed these two 
items separately in Study 3. As in Study 2, trait psychopathy was 
measured using the 56-item PPI-SF (Lilienfeld & Hess, 2001; Study 3 
α= .91) and trait anxiety was measured using the 39-item WAS 
(Welsh, 1956; Study 3 α= .95).
Results
The effects of the following factors were tested in a series of multiple 
regression analyses: between-subjects condition (Immoral Action vs. 
Moral Evaluation), stable individual differences in emotion (as gauged 
by affect, trait psychopathy, and trait anxiety), and their interaction on 
moral judgments and imaginative resistance. Condition was dummy- 
coded (Immoral Action: −0.5; Moral Evaluation: 0.5) and trait variables 
were mean-centered for these analyses. Each model thus tested the statis-
tical significance of three predictor variables (condition, trait variable, 
interaction term) for a single outcome variable (e.g., Imaginability, 
World Right). We present effect sizes as semipartial correlations (sr, the 
variance in a dependent variable uniquely attributable to the predictor 
variable in question). As no significant condition � trait interactions 
were found, we focus our interpretation below on the independent effects 
of condition and trait variables (though full results of these analyses are 
presented in Tables S18-S25 of the Supplemental Materials). We again 
provide Cohen’s ds representing the distance of mean ratings in each 
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condition from the scale’s midpoint to provide an absolute sense of where 
participants fell on our ratings scales (see Table 2). Correlations amongst 
all measures can be found in Table S4 in the Supplemental Materials.
Condition differences in moral judgments and imaginative resistance
Condition means for all primary dependent measures are displayed in 
Figure 12. As in Studies 1–2, ratings of Moral Acceptability did not 
significantly differ between the Immoral Action (M = 2.05, SD = 1.30) 
and Moral Evaluation (M = 2.16, SD = 1.43) conditions (in the model 
with affect: b = 0.04, p = .771, sr = .01; in the model with psychopathy: 
b = 0.02, p = .923, sr = .01; in the model with anxiety: b = 0.12, p = 
.533, sr = .04). Ratings of harmfulness also did not significantly differ 
between the Immoral Action (M = 5.64, SD = 0.73) and Moral 
Evaluation (M = 5.61, SD = 0.87) conditions (in the model with affect: 
b = −0.06, p = .576, sr = −.04; in the model with psychopathy: b = 
−0.04, p = .692, sr = −.03; in the model with anxiety: b = −0.08, p = 
.506, sr = −.05).
Deviating from the pattern seen in Studies 1–2, World Right ratings 
were significantly lower in the Immoral Action condition (M = 2.09, 
SD = 1.43) than in the Moral Evaluation condition (M = 3.05, SD = 
1.90), and this effect was statistically significant in all three models 
tested (in the model with affect: b = 0.85, p < .001, sr = .22; in the 
model with psychopathy: b = 0.78, p = .001, sr = .21; in the model with 
anxiety: b = 0.93, p < .001, sr = .26). Reasoning that this deviation from 
Studies 1–2 was driven by differences in harm severity across the 
vignettes, we examined effect sizes for this condition difference across 
the five vignettes used. Effect sizes tended to be slightly larger for low- 
severity harms as compared to high-severity harms (see Table 3), 
indicating that the ability of an author to render a harmful action 
morally justified in the world of the story was greater when the harm 
in question was less severe. However, small-to-medium effect sizes were 
nonetheless found across all five vignettes included.
Table 2. Mean harmfulness ratings and effect 
sizes (Cohen’s d) for condition differences 
(immoral action vs. moral evaluation) in world 
right ratings across the five vignettes used in 
Study 3.
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However, in line with Studies 1–2, Imaginability ratings did not sig-
nificantly differ between the Immoral Action (M = 2.65, SD = 1.34) and 
Moral Evaluation (M = 3.06, SD = 1.53) conditions in two of the three 
models tested (in the model with affect: b = 0.26, p = .116, sr = .08; in the 
model with psychopathy: b = 0.30, p = .118, sr = .10; condition was 
a significant but fairly weak predictor in the third model with anxiety, 
b = 0.43, p = .031, sr = .15).
As in Studies 1–2, ratings of Belief Right were lower in the Immoral 
Action condition (M = 4.79, SD = 1.20) as compared to the Moral 
Evaluation condition (M = 5.62, SD = 1.38), an effect that emerged in all 
three models tested (in the model with affect: b = 0.81, p < .001, sr = .27; in 
the model with psychopathy: b = 0.79, p < .001, sr = .28; in the model with 
anxiety: b = 0.79, p < .001, sr = .28).
Effects of affect, psychopathy, and anxiety
Figures 13–15 show differences across our primary dependent measures as 
a function of affect, psychopathy, and anxiety. All three trait emotion 
variables were significant predictors of judgments of moral acceptability. 
Higher affect predicted higher ratings of moral acceptability, b = 0.90, p < 
.001, sr = .78, as did higher trait psychopathy, b = 2.03, p < .001, sr = .56, and 
higher trait anxiety, b = 1.31, p < .001, sr = .26. A corresponding pattern of 
results was found for ratings of Harmfulness; higher affect predicted lower 
ratings of harmfulness, b = −0.28, p < .001, sr = −.41, as did higher trait 
psychopathy, b = −0.58, p < .001, sr = −.27, and higher trait anxiety, b = 
−0.49, p = .018, sr = −.16.
Higher affect predicted higher World Right ratings, b = 0.86, p < .001, sr = 
.58, as did higher trait psychopathy, b = 1.47, p < .001, sr = .32, and higher 
trait anxiety, b = 1.33, p = .002, sr = .20. Higher affect also predicted higher 
Table 3. Effect sizes (Cohen’s d) representing the distance of 
the mean rating within each condition from the scale mid-
point in Study 3. Positive numbers indicate number of stan-
dard deviations above the scale midpoint, whereas negative 
numbers indicate number of standard deviations below the 
scale midpoint.
DV Condition Cohen’s d
Moral Acceptability Immoral Action −1.50
Moral Evaluation −1.29
Harmfulness Immoral Action 2.24
Moral Evaluation 1.85
World Right Immoral Action −1.34
Moral Evaluation −0.50
Imaginability Immoral Action −1.01
Moral Evaluation −0.61
Belief Right Immoral Action 0.66
Moral Evaluation 1.18
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Imaginability ratings, b = 0.81, p < .001, sr = .66, as did higher trait 
psychopathy, b = 1.54, p < .001, sr = .40, and higher trait anxiety, b = 1.24, 
p = .001, sr = .23. Of the three emotion variables tested, only trait psycho-
pathy emerged as a significant negative predictor of Belief Right ratings, b = 
−0.83, p < .001, sr = −.23.
Exploratory analyses
Whereas we did not see relationships between trait emotion variables and 
Vividness in Study 2, exploratory analyses in this study indicated that all 
three trait emotions were significant negative predictors of imagined scene 
vividness (affect: b = −0.15, p = .007, sr = −.19; psychopathy: b = −0.53, p = 
.003, sr = −.21; anxiety: b = −0.53, p = .036, sr = −.15). Consistent with 
Studies 1–2, neither condition nor trait emotion variables significantly 
predicted differences in Transportation.
Discussion
The findings of Study 3 build on those from Studies 1–2 in several ways. We 
again found support for the assumption of the imaginative puzzle: World 
Right and Imaginability ratings were quite low in the Immoral Action 
condition, indicating that participants resisted imagining harms as morally 
acceptable even when low-severity physical and emotional harms were 
included in the set of vignettes. However, results regarding the alethic puzzle 
appear to be somewhat contingent upon the severity of the harm partici-
pants were asked to imagine as morally acceptable in the world of the story. 
Whereas differences in World Right ratings between the Immoral Action 
and Moral Evaluation conditions were consistently nonsignificant in prior 
studies, World Right ratings were significantly higher in the Moral 
Evaluation condition in Study 3, suggesting that people are more willing 
to accept an evaluative claim about an immoral action being morally 
justified in the world of the story when the harm caused by that immoral 
action is less severe. However, no such differences emerged for the 
Imaginability item, slightly qualifying this interpretation.
With regard to individual differences in emotion, Study 3 replicated the 
patterns witnessed in Study 2; participants higher in either affect, psycho-
pathy, or anxiety experienced lower levels of imaginative resistance and 
judged harms to be more morally acceptable independently of the effects of 
condition described above. The lack of significant condition by trait emo-
tion interactions lend further credence to our conclusions from Study 2 that 
trait differences in emotion appear to attenuate resistance as conceived by 
the imaginative puzzle but not as conceived by the alethic puzzle.
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General Discussion
In three studies, we empirically demonstrated the strength of imaginative 
resistance as conceptualized by the imaginative and alethic puzzles: people 
consistently experienced difficulty in imagining harm as morally acceptable 
in the world of a story (i.e., the imaginative puzzle) even when the author 
directly stated that the harm was acceptable; the author’s evaluative claims 
did not diminish resistance to imagining harm as morally acceptably but did 
influence people’s ability to imagine that a harmful actor believed their 
actions to be right (i.e., the alethic puzzle). We also show that individual 
differences in affect, psychopathy, and anxiety predict the degree to which 
one resists imagining a morally deviant action as morally acceptable (the 
imaginative puzzle) but did not attenuate responses to an author’s claim 
stating that a deviant action is acceptable (the alethic puzzle). However, 
responses with regard to the alethic puzzle do appear to rely to some degree 
on the severity of the harm in question; people were more willing to go 
along with author’s statements that a harm was morally justified in the 
world of the story when the harms in question included low-severity cases 
(e.g., publicly mocking someone, slapping someone in the face), yet still 
expressed difficulty in personally imagining such harms as morally accep-
table outside of the world of the story.
Our findings help further the empirical understanding of imaginative 
resistance in a number of ways. First, distinguishing between the puzzles in 
the way suggested by Weatherson (2004) adds conceptual clarity to this 
literature, providing a more thorough answer to the question of how imagi-
native resistance occurs. Our findings empirically support the following 
relation between the imaginative and alethic puzzles: one experiences ima-
ginative blockage in attempting to imagine that a morally deviant action 
could be morally acceptable within the world of the narrative, regardless of 
whether an evaluative claim endorsing the action is presented in that 
narrative. The addition of an evaluative claim that endorses the morally 
deviant action does not circumvent this blockage when the morally deviant 
action is a severe harm, though the authorial endorsement may be more 
effective in cases in which the morally deviant action is a less severe harm. 
Unlike most other claims presented in a fictional narrative, the author is 
unable to make an evaluative claim endorsing an immoral action true, 
particularly when the immoral action in question involves causing 
a severe harm. In cases in which the action in question involves a severe 
harm, the authorial endorsement serves only to increase the audience’s 
ability to imagine that the perpetrator of the morally deviant action believed 
that he or she was acting in a morally acceptable manner. In cases in which 
the action in question is a less severe harm, authorial endorsement may have 
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some success in influencing imaginative engagement with the fictional 
world in question, though resistance is still experienced.
Furthermore, we can now see how the phenomenological puzzle relates 
differently to the imaginative and alethic puzzles. This difference in relation 
suggests a possible answer to the question of whether imaginative resistance 
is best thought of in terms of emotional aversion or conceptual impossi-
bility. Our findings suggest that the answer may be both: the imaginative 
puzzle is importantly connected to emotional response, while the lack of 
connection between emotional response and influence of the author’s expli-
cit moral endorsement suggests that the alethic puzzle may be best thought 
of in terms of conceptual thinking. We found that the lack of influence of 
the author’s explicit moral endorsement is consistent across variation in 
emotion, and this suggests that the phenomenological puzzle, the feeling 
involved in the experience of resistance, is not fundamentally important to 
the alethic puzzle. Regardless of variation in one’s tendency to experience 
a certain sort of emotional response to the claims that tend to elicit resis-
tance, one will experience similar resistance in the sense of the alethic 
puzzle. On the other hand, it seems that there is a fundamental relation 
between the phenomenological and imaginative puzzles. We find that var-
iations in emotion correspond with variations in the degree of resistance 
experienced in terms of the imaginative puzzle.
Our studies help clarify why imaginative resistance occurs. Dovetailing 
with work showing that people’s difficulty in imagining morally deviant 
worlds is not necessarily the same sort of difficulty they experience when 
trying to imagine conceptually contradictory worlds (Barnes & Black, 2016), 
we provide evidence that emotion is a crucial component in whether and to 
what degree a person is willing or able to engage with deviant moralities for 
the purposes of a work of fiction. Those who tend to experience less negative 
affect in response to harms – the same individuals that have been shown to 
exhibit lower levels of harm aversion more broadly (Patil, 2015; Pletti et al., 
2017) – also showed lower levels of imaginative resistance as conceptualized 
by the imaginative puzzle, suggesting that difficulty in imagining harms as 
morally acceptable may be part of the more general architecture of harm 
aversion. People’s deeply held moral values may constrain what they are able 
to imagine as acceptable similarly to how these values have been shown to 
constrain what people intuitively judge as possible (Phillips & Cushman, 
2017).
Whereas we had expected that higher ratings in psychopathy and 
positive emotional response would correlate with diminished resis-
tance in terms of the imaginative puzzle, the correlation of higher 
anxiety ratings with diminished resistance was surprising. One may 
expect that those with higher trait anxiety ratings would experience 
a more visceral emotional aversion to imagining the harms described 
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and provide lower ratings of acceptability as a result of this aversion, 
in line with past work showing positive relationships between anxiety 
and harm aversion more broadly (Perkins et al., 2013). However, we 
found that higher anxiety ratings actually correlate with higher accept-
ability ratings, both in terms of imagined and actual acceptability. One 
possible explanation for this finding lies in the correlation between 
high anxiety ratings and low ratings of imagined vividness; this is 
a correlation shared by high psychopathy ratings, and by more posi-
tive affect ratings. Trait anxiety, which is associated with higher levels 
of emotional reactivity, may initially seem to have little in common 
with trait psychopathy, which is associated with low emotional reac-
tivity. However, at least in terms of imaginative resistance, it is 
possible that the key relation between these traits is not emotional 
reactivity, but rather is the similar role that these different levels of 
emotional reactivity play in causing a lack of vivid imaginative engage-
ment, which in turn causes diminished resistance. High anxiety indi-
viduals may be less able to vividly imagine harm because of an initial 
emotional aversion to imagining harm. This would be consistent with 
recent findings that individuals with generalized anxiety disorder ima-
gine negative (but not positive) events in less detail as compared to 
healthy controls (Wu et al., 2015) and experience greater difficulties in 
imagining future events as compared to controls more broadly 
(Moustafa et al., 2018). Such deficits may lead individuals higher in 
anxiety to make higher acceptability judgments because they have not 
actually imagined the scenario at the level of vividness that would lead 
one to experience a greater level of imaginative resistance. Imagining 
harm more vividly could lead one to think of that harm as more 
severe and thus as less acceptable. Because anxiety may prevent such 
vivid engagement (Moustafa et al., 2018; Wu et al., 2015), the harm 
may be considered by individuals higher in anxiety to be less severe, 
resulting in less imaginative resistance being experienced by these 
individuals. By contrast, individuals with higher psychopathy ratings 
may imagine with less vividness not because of an emotional aversion 
to imagining harm, but because of a more general flattened affect 
(Hare, 1963). So, it might be the case that two very different routes 
lead high anxiety and high psychopathy individuals to imagine with 
diminished vividness, but that it is this shared lack of vividness that 
leads both to experience diminished resistance in terms of the imagi-
native puzzle. However, such an interpretation is largely speculative at 
this point, and further research would be needed to better understand 
the relationship between anxiety and imaginative resistance.
We also acknowledge that the vignettes used in our studies, despite in 
some cases being fairly outlandish, were situated in real-world contexts and 
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thus may not have led participants to feel as though they were engaging with 
fictional, hypothetical worlds (in other words, the sorts of contexts in which 
imaginative resistance has traditionally been explored). Our intention in 
using these sorts of vignettes was to bridge the phenomenon of imaginative 
resistance with real-world moral cognition and harm aversion. Nonetheless, 
we included some vignettes adapted directly from the imaginative resistance 
literature (e.g., the “death on a freeway” scenario from Weatherson, 2004) 
and repeatedly emphasized to participants that what they were reading were 
works of fiction (e.g., by referring to vignettes as short stories and the actors 
as “characters” in our instructions and dependent measures). Further, the 
“Realism” ratings collected in Study 2 (“How likely is an event similar to this 
narrative to occur in the real world?”, rated from 1 = very unlikely to 7 = very 
likely) allow us to explore this question empirically. Across the seven 
scenarios used, ratings on this measure were essentially at the midpoint of 
this scale with a fair amount of variability (M = 4.03, SD = 1.61). Removing 
the Setup condition (where no immoral actions occurred), average ratings 
fell below midpoint with a similar amount of variance (M = 3.39, SD = 1.44) 
indicating that, on average, participants in our studies perceived vignettes 
depicting immoral actions to be more unrealistic than realistic and thus 
were unlikely to experience great difficulty in seeing these vignettes as 
occurring in fictional worlds different from our own.
Others (Black et al., 2018; Kim et al., 2018; Liao et al., 2014) have 
experimentally investigated imaginative resistance in terms of how var-
iation in the sort of narrative presented, namely variation in genre, can 
lead to variation in the experience of imaginative resistance. For exam-
ple, Liao et al. find that imaginative resistance to harmful actions is 
diminished if the action in question occurs within the context of 
a myth. By contrast, our studies suggest that variation in the individual, 
namely variation in emotional response, can account for variation in 
imaginative resistance. Research on genre and imaginative resistance is 
helpful in addressing the question of which sorts of scenarios engender 
imaginative resistance (e.g., with more fantasy-oriented stories engen-
dering less resistance; Liao et al., 2014), and our work in Study 3 
addresses this question as well, suggesting that scenarios that feature 
less severe harms may engender less resistance. But our studies, along 
with other recent work (Black & Barnes, 2017) fill a need for empirical 
work focused on the question of which particular aspects of the indivi-
dual are responsible for the experience of resistance. Our findings 
suggest that the answer to this question critically involves individuals’ 
emotional responsiveness and dispositions.
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